In the first part of my paper, I tried to outline the common characteristics of Bibó's social and political philosophy, focussing of our on such problems as historical dead ends and politic hysterias. In this second part, I would like to investigate the following problems:
I. The notions of 'elites' and 'exploitation' in Bibó's conceptual world.
II. The problem of legitimation and its various manifestations.
III. Historical lessons for peacemakers: the Peace Treaty of Vienna and peace treaties in general as turning points of European history.
IV. The paralysis of international institutions and its remedies.
V. Principles and institutions, relationship between power and human morals: can power be humanized?

I. The notions of 'elites' and 'exploitation' in Bibó's conceptual world

If we read Bibó's works including short treatises from the beginning of his career and his mature works as well, we must face the fact,that Bibó was interested in the problem of elites throughout his life. The notion of elites was vitally important in the writings before the second world war but we can detect this problem in his late work Reflections on the Social Development of Europe, although the Bibó was inclined to use the term 'socially organizing intellectuals' instead of the notion of elites.
The investigations carried out into the structures of society frequently concluded in the problem of elites, between the two world wars, reminds us of such thinkers like Oswald Spengler and Ortega y Gasset or Arnold Toynbee. Bibó was not an exception to the rule. We can raise the question: why did this issue seem to be so exciting and important for these scholars? The answers to this question will be rather plausible and simple: the first world war meant a watershed in the history of European civilization. The commonly held social moral and political values burnt to ashes 'in the storm of blood and iron'. We know well,that at the breaking out of war was a shared enthusiasm not only among the 'common people' but among the intellectuals as well. But this hope failed to fulfill and the war left only ruins behind her. So the pre-war enthusiasm changed into post-war disillusionment. Many thinkers thought that old familiar pre-war values would be replaced by new repulsive values which would endanger the whole European civilization. Ortega y Gasset found a very suggestive expression for this fear, in his famous book The riot of the masses . However this title described and summarized all the fears of his period and besides an explicit opposition between two ideas, that of elites and masses. Naturally Ortega was not the one who invented these notions, but he set up a consequently built-up framework of reference in which these terms got a central place. Ortega in another writing entitled Espana invertebrada [Spain lacking backbone] applied his theory for Spanish history. He worked out a periodization according to the logic of his theory.
Ortega's theoretical starting-point was the miserable condition of Spain after the first world war. He contrasted this situation with the age of Philip II., when Spain had enjoyed the status of a major power. Ortega stated that the cause of this collapse had been a lack of meritorious virtuous persons, so every social problem was led back by him to the question of elites.
In Ortega's periodization the whole history of mankind is dominated by two periods which are continually replacing each other. These epochs are Kitra and Kali. Kitra is a fruitful era, because it creates a well established world-order. In this period every caste performs its own duty: the elites rule and govern society, and the inferior castes do their own special activities. Consequently, the society is in a flourishing state, and if everything goes well,it is a well-balanced state of things. The state of Kali is just opposite to Kitra: in this period the world-order turns up. The inferior castes fail to fulfill their duties and deny obeying the elites. This is an era of masses, when common people wish to be leaders, and the world sinks into chaos. This is the age of disorder.
This explanation was described in a mythological style by Ortega. For instance at the down of Kitra god Brahman awakes from his slumbering and recreates the collapsed world-order, whereas at the night of this age he goes to sleep and the universe remains without a master,and the forces of darkness overrule¹.
It is undeniable,that the aforementioned scheme is mythological and irrational, and in spite of this fact proved to be a highly esteemed and acceptable theory for the contemporary social scientist and men of letters. We must pose the question: why? The answer is simple and difficult at the same time. The answer simple, because we know the intimidated and shaky public mood of that era, the next explanations seems to be plausible : in this intellectual climate there was a very high degree of responsiveness to mythological world-explanation theories which are easy to comprehend and cover all phenomena of the world. But the answer is difficult,because we cannot underestimate our predecessors' intellectual abilities. It is too easy to make a sentence at first sight.One is always a prisoner of his/her age, and the main task for a historian or a philosopher is to find the special intellectual, moral and human motives in the age which he /she is involved. Let us remind Collingwood's inspiring theory about the importance of intuition in the research of history. Notwithstanding the era between two word wars is from many aspects very similar to ours: after 1920 collapsed the old world order, and something very similar happened after 1989 with the disintegration of the USSR and fall of Communism. First of all the situation of Central and Eastern Europe in the 1920 - ies was analogous to the situation of this region this time. The values of rationalism and liberal democracy were questioned after the First World War and the public opinion was prone to accept irrational, mythological concepts and had a very strong disposition for qualifying the idea of democracy as a mere illusion. However, this was the age of thus called philosophies of crisis. We must keep in sight, that the theories of the elites were part of this kind of philosophy. Young István Bibó did not avoid the influence of this world-mood, in my opinion here lays the main cause of his interest in the problem of elites. We can not detect Ortega's direct impact upon him,but we have a good reason to assume an indirect influence, namely through László Németh [1901-1975] the well-known and famous Hungarian writer who played a very significant role in the Hungarian culture. László Németh founded a one man literal journal, it was the Tanu [Witness] and in which he dealt not only with the problems of literature but with the issues of contemporary philosophy. László Németh in 1932-33 wrote 'diary of a critic' in which he wrote a book-review on Ortega's bestseller La rebellion de la masses [The riot of the masses]. Here he reproduced the main trains of thought from Ortega's book. First of all László Németh was very enthusiastic about Ortega's intellectual achievement. He wrote that Ortega had recognised the essence of the European crisis. Németh agreed with Ortega that the crisis was not economic , because it was only a symptom, but the illness was hiding beyond it. This illness - continued László Németh - was a riot of the masses which would destroy European culture². In Németh's theory the only way out from the barbarism is the recreation of new elites, more precisely his term was the 'new nobility'
In an interview Bibó explained that László Németh's theory about elites had seemed very convincing for him until l935³. It was not by chance that Bibó's writings about the problem of elites were born in the early 1940 -ies. These were: A pénz [The money];1942, Elit és szociális érzék [Elites and the sense of social responsibilities],1942,and a book-review on Karl Mannheim's book Diagnosis of our times from 1942. Above I mentioned Ortega's theory as a lofty example of irrational thinking. To tell the truth this irrationalism is just one of his many coloured conceptual world. I would be very incorrect if I evaluated him as a dogmatic irrationalist. Maybe I am correct in classifying him as a good diagnostician but a bad therapeutist. He was very sharp eyed when he was describing Spain's painful condition in the first decades of the 20th century, but the treatment he prescribed against the social maladies was worse than the illness itself. Precisely this sharp eyed diagnostician was who enchanted László Németh and others. We shall see that the young Bibó was influenced by Ortega, another good diagnostician. [We saw - as I explained in the first part of my paper - that Bibó had a horror of any kind of irrationalism.]
We can not forget that between the two world wars, Spain and Hungary were in similar position among European states. Spain in the 20th century had not been a major power for quite a long time. The splendour of golden age which the country had enjoyed under Philip II. remained a half-forgotten dream.This miserable situation was expressed in Don Quixote's fate: after his adventures he was dying in his bed full of disillusionment losing his faith in his former miraculous dreams: 'I was mad,but I am now in my senses; I was once Don Quixote of La Mancha,but I am now, as I said before, Alonso Qixano the Good' [Part I. Ch.25.] On the other hand Hungary after 1920 when had been grossly mutilated losing two thirds of its territory and a half of its population suffered in very similar problems: the medieval Hungarian Kingdom had been a regional power in Eastern Europe and after 1867 as a consequence of Austro-Hungarian Compromise Hungary became the co-nation of Austro-Hungarian Monarchy which undoubtedly was an European Major Power. In 1896 the Hungarian nation celebrated the millenium of its state founding, and some of the Hungarian politicians were dreaming of a Hungary with 30 million inhabitants. But after 1920 the great power dreams were replaced by the bitter reality: Hungary had been diminished to a little country. This was a shock for Hungary as was for Spain, the losing of its great power status. Describing the situation in the terms of the Immanuel Wallerstein's school: both countries had lost the previous status in the system of world-economy. Spain had sunken into the states of half-periphery, Hungary had to face the danger of delegating to the periphery.
We must keep in mind: the analogy between Spain and Hungary cannot be overtensi- fied: the differences between two countries were in greater number than similarities. Notwithstanding the analogy in this case proved justifiable from many angles. This fact explains why Ortega's thoughts had popularity among the Hungarian thinkers. Ortega's analysis would have as well be made about Hungary. That was why László Németh greeted Ortega's intellectual achievement with great respect. But now we can raise the question: what have Ortega's ideas got to do with Bibó's theory on the social role of elites? The answer needs a comparative study of their thoughts.
Ortega's Espagna invertebrada was born in 1921 and explicitly had been influenced by Oswald Spengler's Der Untergang des Abendlandes At the beginning of the book Ortega stated out that every society is an organism, and for creating a nation there need to be two basic abilities: the ability of will and the ability of giving order ⁴. The notion of strength is very important in Ortega's conceptual world. This means not only a physical but also a spiritual ability for him. In his interpretation strength gives a nation a real chance for realizing its future plans⁵. Ortega explained that these plans for future endeavours mean the most important social cohesive factors in the life of a nation. So a nation must orientate to the future and not to the past.
In the Spanish author's opinion the decline of Spain began in 1580, the Spanish ascent had stopped under Philip II. For presenting the painful conditions of Spain, Ortega used a metaphor borrowed from Nature: he wrote that Spain had been in the state of a many century long autumn. ' The wild autumnal wind-storm is tearing the bunches of dry leaves from the dead boughs' - the author so crowned the melancholic picture⁶. Besides Ortega evaluated the particularity of different social groups as the saddest aspect of Spanish misery. He regretted that the social classes could not rise above their egoistic interests. Here Ortega used an organic metaphor, in which society appears as a living body and its classes as strata of its parts. The whole is always superior to its parts -pointed out Ortega condemning the actio directa which is most harmful symptom of self-destroying social egoism⁷. Ortega trying to describe the factors which in his opinion are indispensable for creating a well-functioning society, mentioned the relationship between the ruling elites and the obeying masses. He suggested that nothing can describe the conditions of a given society more precisely than this⁸. In the Espana invertebrada he strongly emphasized that the elites positions are due to the confidence of the masses and not to the personal abilities by which the members of elites are vested. Expressing in other terms in his theory the elites are creatures created by the masses. This happens so because a society in lack of governing elites ceases to function.
This above mentioned opinion harmonizes with young Bibó's idea which was formulated by him in Elit és szociális érzék [Elites and the sense of social responsibilities] in 1942. Here he pointed out, that we can not detect a society in the history of the mankind which did not have any elites. The main task which these elites have to face is the leading the society entrusted to its stewardship⁹. But Bibó gave in this writing further details on the duties of social organizing elites: 1. to give a pattern for moral behaviour in different human situations 2. the enrichement and refinement of human needs¹⁰.
Bibó in his treatise, set up the diagnosis of crisis in European civilization as Ortega did in his respective works . The most spectacular symptom which always designates crisis in a given society - argued Bibó - is the collapse of self-confidence in the elites. The elites become too shaky and intimidated - which in Bibó's theory means the begining of the social crisis. The elites certainly try to compensate for this shaky position, but this endeavour results in some kind of overcompensation. As the main consequence of this process among the members of the ruling elites appears the sense of superfluousness. And among different social classes the idea of exploitation takes places, the view that the elites are mere parasites who suck the blood of their society. In other words this mood suggests that the elites exploit the society.
Young Bibó strongly refused this point of view. In his above mentioned writing the Elit és szociális érzék [Elites and the sense of social responsibilities] he explained that the supreme good which can be enjoyed by a society are good functioning elites which do not exploit the society but serve it¹¹. So the privileges of the ruling elites are the consequences of their genuine social achievements. But - warned Bibó - when the elites failed to fulfill their social duties, they become an exploiting social strata.
In Bibó's view the well functioning elites are similar to what was described in Ortega's theory. The members of elites are the persons who consciously formulate the urgent social tasks and lead the society to realize them. The crisis of Europe after the First World War was presented by Bibó as the consequence of the fall of European traditional elites. Finally, in Bibó's interpretation this meant the wholesale crisis of European value-system. So he evaluated the situation that here the whole European civilization had run into a dead end. We should not forget that this opinion had been held by the young thinker and later he changed this opinion.
We know that the first important representative of these so-called 'philosophies of crisis' was Oswald Spengler, who in his famous and many times cited book - Untergang des Abenlandes - foretold of the collapse of Western civilization. His book had been tipically an historical prophesy which later so passionately was rejected by Karl Popper as the worst byproduct of historicism. Nothwithstanding, it is undeniable that Spengler's book is a basic reference source which exerted vast influence upon the intellectuals' world-mood in the inter-war era. Speaking on philosophies of crisis we simple cannot avoid him.

What was the main motive which inspired Spengler for writing his book? In the foreword of his work he declared that he wanted to create the philosophy of destiny [eine Philosophie des Schicksaal] which would explain and interpret the past and the future of West. As the proper method for this investigation he designated the analogy which make us acquaint with the different species of 'living forms' [Das Mittel, lebendige Formen zu verstehen, ist die Analogie¹².] The method of analogy using in a proper way makes us acquainted with the organic structure of history [die organische Structure der Geschichte] and will enable us to predict our future.
If we want to briefly characterize Spengler's system in Popper's terminology, we can say that it is a kind pro-naturalistic historism. Spengler characterized his own philosophy as the morphology of the history of the world [Morphologie der Weltgeschichte]. He declared that his philosophy had described the stages of development in different civilizations. He wrote on the biology of the history of the world. In his view a civilization does not have a special aim, because every society is as aimless an entity as plants in the fields. So mankind is one of the biological species and the notion of mankind is an idea for zoology: " Aber 'die Menscheit' hat kein Ziel, keine Idee, keinen Plan,so wenig wie die Gattung der Schmetterlinge oder der Orchideen ein Ziel hat. 'Die Menscheit' ist ein zoologischer Begriff oder ein leeres Wort¹³."
Spengler's philosophy contained the idea of masses as well. In the life of every great historical entity he distinguished two main phases: 1. the phase of culture 2. the phase of civilization. So - pointed out Spengler - civilization is the inevitable future for every culture¹⁴. In other words civilization succeeds organically from culture [organische Nacheinander]. From these presuppositions he deduced the fall of the West - more specific, the Untergang des Abendlandes. He drew a parallel between the culture of Antiquity and the culture of the West. As inevitably had been replaced the culture of Antiquity by its civilization, i.e. Hellenism as inevitably was replaced the culture of West by its civilization, i.e. Imperialism.
In Spengler's train of thought appeared an undeniably emphasized antimodernism. In spite of the fact, that he declared as a main task for a historian to be an objective observer in describing the processes of history, in his own book he could not realize the noble idea of 'sine ira et studio'. The civilization for him meant a kind of historic degeneracy.
In the period of civilization appears the opposition between the metropolis and province. Spengler was one of the forerunners of 'völkisch' movement, which can be translated populism. He wrote on the lifestyle of metropolis in a despiteful manner contrasting the tradition-preserving ,the ancient and pure moral values safeguarding peasantry with the parasitic irresponsible and lustful city dwellers:
'Statt einer Welt eine stadt,ein Punkt, in dem sich das ganze Leben weiter Lander sammelt, wahrend der rest verdorrt;statt eines formvolllen ,mit der Erde verwachsenen Volkes ein neuer Nomade,ein Parasit,der GroBstadtbewohner,der reine, traditionslose,on formlos fluktuinder Masse auftretende Tatsachenmensch,irreligiös,intelligent, unfruchtbar,mit einer tiefen Abneigung gegen das Bauerntum ( und dessen höchste Form,den Landadel¹⁵)...'
This long citation is highly instructive for many reasons. First it briefly summarizes Spengler's point of view containing the main ideas which later were borrowed by his followers.
But at this point we are interested first of all in the notion of 'Masse' which later is opposed to the notion of 'Volk'. So in the Untergang des Abendlandes we can detect an archetype of theories for elites. There are here every essential feature of his theories: the opposition between elites and masses, the presentation of history as a process of degeneration, because civilization undoubtedly meant for Spengler a degeneration. This assertion can be proved easily if we continue the reading his book.
Writing on the age of civilization, on the age metropolis, on the age of the masses he mentioned another phenomenon in an pejorative way: it was the 'cosmopolitism' the dominating world view in the era of civilization. How did he interpret this concept? First of all this embodied for him a distorted way of human life which is contrasted with patriotism. This meant for him an arid rationalism which had subverted the old good virtues, and had questioned everything.
Ortega was Spengler's disciple, speaking of the biology of history. Writing on the masses the Spanish thinker emphasized: it denies its biological mission when turning his back on the elites and denying to follow their instructions. In his analysis this disobedience concludes in collapse of every social institution. Ortega reflected Spengler writing on civilization, which in his interpretation was as the second period of development, as it had been presented previously by Spengler. His classification of people, writing on : 'fellah people' followed Spengler as well.
The 'fellah peoples' in Ortega's interpretation are the people who do not have any elites. He worried,that Spain was tending - in spite of the fact, that Spain is the member of the family for Western 'culture-creating' peoples - to go awry to the fellah peoples' cul de sac. The roots of Spanish misery were detected by Ortega in the Spanish Middle Ages. He declared that Spain had not had genuine feudalism. He contrasted the Spanish Middle Ages with the French Middle Ages, and pointed out that during this period Spain had been in lack of feudal nobility. So Ortega led back the causes of Spanish backwardness to the lack of medieval elites. At this point of his train of thought he introduced a notion of race biology to his theory. Namely he stated out that Visigothic people which had occupied Iberian peninsula establishing a kingdom had been a biologically old and tired people without a proper number creating elites. Because of the fact that the Visigothic people were the ancestors of Spanish people - at least in Ortega's opinion - the Spanish troubles originate from biological causes¹⁶. [But very important to emphasize, that neither Spengler nor Ortega were not rascist thinkers, and their theories were not rascist theories.]
Spengler's method is based on the using of analogies, and some of these analogies were borrowed from the field of biology. Ortega's biological allusions did not playe a major role in his philosophy. In fact both of them can be characterized as conservative thinkers, who took an antimodernistic point of view. I mentioned earlier, how pejorative connotation had been given the idea of civilization in Spengler's book. Now I must call the attention, that Ortega predicted the end of modernity , and from this prediction borrowed optimism in connection with the future of Spain. How was he reasoning? First of all he was convinced that the modernism is a very fit period to the English , French and partly German national traits. What are the main features of modernity in Ortega's conceptual world ? These are th following ones¹⁷: 1. rationality 2. democratism 3. industrialism 4. mechanization.

After taking this detour to Spengler's and Ortega's philosophies we must return to young Bibó's theory on the elites. I briefly touched on one of his treatises in this field, namely the Elit és szociális érzék [Elites and the sense of social responsibilities], now I am going to sum up the main thoughts of another relevant writing, A pénz [The money]. Here Bibó presented a kind of antimodernism which was a characteristic feature of this early writing. He drew a parallel between the modern money based economy and the spreading of quantitative evaluation. The latter idea meant that the modern age evaluates everything in numbers: a good example for this phenomenon the recording of sports achievement in numbers. So modernity has been created a one dimensional world¹⁸. But values are many dimensional entities, which distort if enforced into the frameworks of a one-dimensional world. Bibó mentioned as a typical case the role of institutions. This is an ancient institution which is very applicable for solving everyday problems of a given society,but inherently unable for choosing between different values -argued Bibó. So young Bibó had doubts about political system of modern democracy based on general suffrage. He evaluated modernity as the period of a wholesale crisis in European social development. Something had happened at the end of the Middle Ages - argued Bibó - and he thought this was a disintegration of a transcendentally based world-view. In the Middle Ages a rigid society was existing which determined the social positions for every individual from his/her birth to his/her death, so social mobility was at a very low level. But it was the price of a well-organized society, in which a solid value system was existing ensuring that everyone performed the social duties which were the consequences of his/her social position¹⁹.
Undeniably the Medieval society could not ensure the individual's liberties in the sense as to how we interpret these liberties, but nobody had a sense of lack because of this fact. Every individual - i.e. allot - could calculate his/her way of life, the social ties were very strong, and the sense of alienation was unknown for this age. The social elites, i.e. the feudal landlords fulfilled their social duties, protected their own country and ensured the tranquillity of life for their serfs. These idealistic conditions blew up at the end of the Middle Ages: the elites ceased to fulfill their duties and the peasants revolted against their lords, who had really become an exploiting social stratum. Roughly speaking this was the young Bibó's theory on the Middle Ages.In his interpretation the sunset of the Middle ages first of all exhibited in the collapse of two social strata, which had previously maintained the social order: the church and the nobility. The privileges which had been ensured for the nobility as a return service for the fulfilment of their social duties were questioned by the inferior social classes, i.e. the peasantry and the new-born bourgeoisie.
So, at the beginning of modern times the bourgeoisie took over the elite positions from the nobility and the clergy. But young Bibó evaluated these changes as a loss of values. In his opinion the bourgeoisie could not substitute the old lost traditional values with new ones. In this writing Bibó identified the citoyen with the bourgeois, and wrote in a rather despising manner on capitalism. He evaluated the processes of modernization, that it had distorted the order of the Bible [The parable of the talents , St.Matthew, 25.14-31] to an avid money-making of capitalist bourgeoisie. So Bibó's evaluation of capitalist spirit is just the opposite to that of Max Weber. Young Bibó's opinion on the role of money in a capitalist society was very similar to Spengler's one. The German thinker qualified the role of money extremely harmful for the social life. In Der Untergang des Abendlandes he connected the money-based economy with the age of civilization. His main objection to money was,that it distorts the many-sided values to one dimensional entities: 'Das Wirthchaftsbild wird asschlie Blich auf Quantitaten zurückgeführt,unter Absehen von der Qualitat,die gerade das wesentliche Merkmal des Gutes bildet²⁰' However, we would be wrong, if we thought that young Bibó was as conservative a thinker definitely rejecting the whole modernity with its achievements,as Spengler and Ortega were. In A pénz [The money] he rejected, that the money would be wrong in itself, just the opposite, he declared, that money is a miraculous tool for realizing such levels of human liberty, which were not attainable before. The value-crisis and the introduction of money-based economy had coincided - wrote Bibó - but money had not been the cause of the crisis²¹. In his mentioned book-review on Karl Mannheim's book, entitled Diagnosis of our time he distanced himself from the theories of elites, and declared that a new value-system must be based on values borrowed from different ideologies, including Christianity and liberalism as well.

II. The problem of legitimation in Bibó's conceptual world

Mostly in the first part of my paper I treated Bibó's thoughts on the problem of power, and now I must emphasize, that it was one of the main ideas in his philosophy. We saw, that in his theory the ideal society is based on mutually beneficial services among the members of this society, and social development is equal with the lessening of coercion and fear of coercion. But the first question behind the problem of power is the question of legitimation. In 1934-35 István Bibó spent an academic year in Geneva as a scholarship grantee. Here he was the Guglielmo Ferrero's disciple. Guglielmo Ferrero was one of the most popular historians in the first decades of 20th century. His books,especially Aventure. Bonaparte en Italy,1796-97 , Reconstruction, Talleyrand`a Vienne (1814-15), and Pouvoir. Les génies invisibles de la cité greatly influenced the young scholar. In Bibó's two monumental works Az európai egyensúlyról és békérol [On European Balance and Power] and A nemzetközi államközösség bénultsága és annak okai. [The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies] we can detect the Italian historian's impact. In the first part of my paper I indicated,that Az európai egyensúlyról és békérõl [On European Balance and Power] meant a turning-point in Bibó's intellectual career. In this work he proved a ripe, well balanced thinker. Here we can not find the aristocratic elite theory, which so deeply characterized the above mentioned early writings. We must face the fact, that this work was born during the second world war, and this situation deeply determined its subject. Before a presumable peace treaty Bibó tried to outline the principles of good peace making. He started from two previous peace treaties, these were the peace treaty arranged by Congress of Vienna, and the Peace Treaty of Versailles. In fact these peace treatises were diametrically opposed to each other, at least if we evaluate them considering their later consequences. The Peace Treaty of Vienna - at least in Ferrero's and Bibó's interpretation - was a very successful peace construction, which established the European order for long decades. Just the opposite case was the peace Treaty of Versailles after the First World War, because it sowed the seeds of a new world war.
Bibó when he was nearing the end of his life turned back to the problem of peace making in his late work,entitled A nemzetközi államközösség bénultsága és annak okai [The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies] In his writing is a point of departure that the number of unarranged international debates was increasing and the international affairs were poisoned by this fact. Bibó was writing this treatise during long years, between 1965-74. This work consists of two parts: the first part gives the theoretical background, and the second one contains two case studies on Israel and Cyprus.
However, it was not by chance, that the title of my paper is Can Power Be Humanized? because it was one of the most important vital problems for István Bibó. Behind this humanization lays the issue of legitimation. In the first part I mentioned Bibó's theory on deadlocks referring to Germany. Following the logic of theory, we shall face the fact, that these deadlocks were connected to the crisis of legitimation. I must point out,that the aforementioned theory of elites is deeply connected with the issue of legitimation, because the crisis of society-organizing elites always results in the crisis of legitimation. That was why the crisis in the late Middle Ages manifested in the form of crisis for legitimation.
But we rightly can pose a question: how and why did the concept of legitimation in the history of mankind arise ? Why does the naked force prove unable for stabilizing human societies ? We must keep in mind, that the answers for these questions are the bearing pillars of Bibo's theory. In The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies he outlined the problem in the following manner: ' Social theorists have searched for centuries for a valid justification for the legitimacy of power - one that transcends mere fluctuating military suppemacy or personal tyranny. Not suprisingly the forms of organisation, social structures,formulae of principles and theoretical tenets vconnected with this problem have not developed evenly or to the same degree in every culture. often the political thought and social structure of very advanced cultures become arrested by exposure to brutal oppresion. Sometimes the great thinkers in a society ignore the political and social events of their time and concentrate on more spiritual and transcendent matters. In two great cultures, the Graeco-Roman and the /chinese, both rulers and ruled defined the nature of power; and consequently, the masses who endured, supported or suspected the power élite were able to question it. Through this idea of justifying power and of needing legitimacy for power became a decisive factor in these two cultu and a force which deeply affected other societies. Sometimes the idea were used to justify the existing power, at other times to provoke mass risings and transform society through revolution. It is no historical chance that the most eminent and profound political philosophers in Greece,Rome and China were also involved in practical politics²².'
It was not by chance - as I touched on it ( first part of my paper, see: Can Power Be Humanized ? I. 9-11.pp.) - that in Bibó's opinion social development could take place only in China and Europe. So he drew a parallel between legitimation and social development. In fact, social development is grounded on special kinds of legitimation.
The theory of legitimation in Bibó's social philosophy is deeply affected by Guglielmo Ferrero's thoughts related to this problem. In 1921 Ferrero wrote a book, entitled La ruine de la civilisation antique, in which he dealt with the causes of crisis of Antiquity. At last Ferrero designated political causes for this crisis, leading back the phenomenon of crisis to the troubles of legitimation.He posed the question: what had been the grounds for legitimation in the Roman Empire. According to his answer the Roman emperors' power was legitimised by the Roman Senate. It happened in the name of the 'lex de imperio'²³. Certainly in fact several times the new emperor grasped the power by force, but this power became a legitimate one just after the recognition of the senate. Ferrero emphasized,that this recognition had not been a formal one, just the opposite; only it could have made the emperor's power acceptable for the subjects as a right justifiable and legitimate one. In other words, the in the Roman Empire the principle of monarchism was mixed with the principles of republicanism, moreover,an institution of the aristocratic republicanism,i.e. the senate legitimated the monarch's power. This kind of political power needed appropriately trained and cultured political elites.When the Roman Empire was in its blossom, the emperors consciously protected elites. That happened under Flavius Vespasianus (69-79) when the emperor enlarged the tired old aristocracy of senate with provincial families. So he renewed the social organizing elites²⁴.
But after Septimius Severus'(193-211) killing unleashed the endless hysteria of political violence to Roman society. Ferrero designated the causes of this extremelly harmful social phenomenon in the collapse of institution of senate. In the following period soldier emperors were ruling, but it was the era of endless violence. Most of these emperors died in violent manner, ussually their soldiers killed them. These events justified - in Ferrero's theory - that mere force cannot provide peaceful conditions for society, in other words, that the military forces can not be on solid grounds for power. From this historical example Ferrero drew the next conclusion: 'where the power says the first word, it will say the last one, to the point when the inner strength of the given civilization will have run down²⁵'. If the force takes place, it will demolish all the social insitutions of society and will make the fearless human life impossible.
The opposition to the idea of legitimation is the idea of usurpation. This means such kind of power, which is not backed up by the public conviction, that it is a right and justifiable power. In Ferrero's opinion among the causes of crisis for the Roman Empire the political one was most important,albeit there were other factors: the fall of politeism and increasing barbarism. So, in the investigation of social life the field of politics had a priority for the Italian thinker. We can detect this conception in Bibó's social philosophy as well. He denied the point of view of economic determinism, which is represented by vulgar marxism, and usually emphasized the priority of politics in the life of society. Such social phenomena like deadlocks and hysterias are the troubles of political life. Bibó very often mentions the importance of political psychology. But what were the governing principles of legitimation for Antiquity in Ferrero's theory ? First of all this civilization was deeply convinced on human individuals' inborn inequality. This idea was connected with the conception on different peoples' inequality. The Greeks and Romans believed that they were superior to the neighbouring 'barbar' peoples. However, the aristocratic idea of human inequality based the aristocratic political structures of Antiquity. We must not forget, that the Athenian democracy on the one hand was a short interlude, and on the other hand it it did not abandoned the theory of human inequality. In Ferrero's conceptual world Christianity undermined this conception, declaring every human individual's inherent equality before the Judge of Heaven. Christianity became the gravedigger of antique conceptions of legitimation, but at one time grounded the later European conceptions of democracy based on innate human equality²⁶. Besides Ferrero declared, that the political order of the Roman Empire had proved fragile because of a lack of institution for dynastic succesion. The method of adoption proved inadequte for ensuring the peaceful transition in the time of 'interregnum'. Diocletian by assumption the title 'Dominus et Deus' tried to apply the theory of God-Emperors, who originate from Heaven, but his efforts resulted in ephemerel success.
Ferrero did not concealed the parallel between the crisis of Antiquity and the crisis of modern times after the First World War. He declared, that after the war the principles of legitimation had failed to fulfil their function. He mentioned here two principle: 1. the principle of dynastic legitimation 2. the modern principle of people's sovereignity. In his opinion the dinastic legitimation is an ancient principle, which was underlaying the European political structures for more than one thouasand years. After the French revolution of 1789 ,this principle which emphasized the descending theory of power, declaring that power descends from God, was replaced by the new theory, which declared, that the political power originates from the people, i.e. based on citizens' consensus. Ferrero, considering the post-war developments was very sceptical about the future of people's sovereignity. He worried, Europe would sink in barbarism and dictatorship²⁷. He was terrified by the collapse of political authorities in Central and Eastern Eorope, and complained, that the democratic idea of legitimation had been questioned also in Western Europe. Bibó in Az európai egyensúlyról és a békérõl [On European Balance and Peace] presented a very similar point of view analysing the European social development after the First World War. In a chapter of his writing, German Political Hysteria focussing his attention he declared, that the main cause of German post-war political crisis had been the crisis of legitimation. In practice Germany suffered from the lack of a functioning idea for legitimation. The war had the old aristocratic German elites went bankrupt, but the old dynastic idea of legitimation sank together with them. There were not new political elites who would have been able to fill the political vacuum created by the war. The war and the German revolution demolished the territorial principalities and the Aristocratic social structures, which had previously been the main obstacles for German social development, but which had been existing political authorities, and did not substitute them with new, commonly accepted political authorities²⁸. In Bibó's interpretation this process was the main cause of arising German fascism. Bibó definetely refused the theory of distortion of German 'national character', denying the existence of any innate national traits. The old scholar in his late work, entitled A nemzetközi államközösség bénultsága és annak orvosságai [The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies] Bibó mentioned Max Weber's name, remarked,that besides Ferrero he was the thinker who had influenced him, when he was creating his theories on legitimation and humanization of power²⁹.
Undoubtedly, this brief remark makes necessary for us to sum up Weber's thoughts about the problem of legitimation. In 1922 - the date is remarkable - Weber wrote a short treatise on the historical types of legitimation, entitled Die drei reinen Typen der legitimen Herrschaft³⁰, in which gave a classification of variations for legitimation. In fact. he enumerated three variations :
1. Legal power based on laws. The pure form of this power is the bureaucratised power. In Weber's classification besides the modern political state structures the capitalist enterprise falls into this category as well.
2. Traditional power based on divine legitimation. [Traditionelle Herrschaft, kraft Glaubens an die Heiligkeit der von jeher vorhanden Ordnungen und Herrengewalten³¹]. The pure form of variation is the patriarchal power. This type was commonly spreading in the European Middle Ages, when it developed into the power based on cooperation between the king and the estates.
3. Power based on personal charisma. This kind of power is rooted in the leading person's individual abilities. Weber put into this category a wide range of powers including the Jewish prophets, and Jesus, or the Greek demagogues. This variation is essentially a transitory phenomenon, which has inclination to transform to patriarchal or legal power. An issue worth mentioning is that Weber mentioned under the type of charismatic power the "Führer Demokratie" in which the political leader successfully manipulate with the democratic means of power. After this short detour let us go back to the original train of thought. I mentioned above, that in Bibó's philosophy the two great peace constructions, namely the Vienna Peace Treaty in 1815 and the Versailles Peace Treaty in 1920 deeply influenced the European development in the field of power balance as well as in the field of social development . In fact , here there are essential parallels between Bibó's conceptual world and Ferrero's political philosophy. In other words Bibó took over,transformed and further developed his former professor's thoughts.
In the first part of this paper I slightly touched on the role of the French revolution of 1789 in Bibó's frame of reference. He evaluated this revolution in a double manner. On the one hand this event eliminated the exaggarated power concentrations in France, so it proved useful for French social development, but on the other hand this unleashed the endless stream of violence to French society and Europe, so it proved very harmful. It was useful because it represented the revolution, imbued with social criticism, and this type of revolution in Bibó's philosophy is essentially an European phenomenon, which - China is an exception -is unknown in the other regions of the world.But the French revolution opened a way for terror as a means for solving social problems: ' The French Revolution was, at the same time, the most and the least successful revolution of European history. most successful because it made possible such a thorough and rational re-organization of society as had never before been accomplished by a revolution,least successful, because it aroused so much fear that the Western World has not recovered from it since. What makes revolutionary violance justifiable and legitimate ? If we reconsider that every violent action and all hatred originates from the fearful, distorted state of man's mind, than we must reject the notion that violance, in and by itself, has a liberating and creative effect, and that certain kinds of social progress simply cannot be imagined without violance³².' Moreover, this revolution created two distorted types of individuals: the professional revolutionary, who wants to solve every problem with revolution, without considering the concrete social conditions, and the professional reactionary who wants to prevent revolution at any cost. Besides these aforementioned harmful phenomena the French Revolution gave a contribution to other nations' deadlocks, in the first place the German political hysteria. If we draw a parallel between Bibó's point of view and Ferrero's, we can find a striking resemblance between them. Ferrero evaluated the French Revolution in a way, which was very similar to Bibó's approach. First of all Ferrero put the question: ' why did the French Revolution result in just the opposite consequences to its participants' wishes ? ' The revolutionaries had wanted liberty but created tiranny. They had wanted constitutional monarchy but condemned the king to death. They had declared the nations' fraternity but involved in destroying wars with their neighbouring nations³³. In his theory he gave a brief and very resoluted answer. He declared that among the principles of the revolution had been fundamental contradictions: ' Par les principes memes de la Révolution, repondent les gens de droite,car ces principes sont chimeriques et leur application impossible. Un tel raisonnement ne résiste pas a la reflexion. Ces memes principes qui ont cause tant de désordre et de contradiction en en France ont été appliques dans des Etats de l'Europe e de l'Amerique...Et ce sont ces forces secretes qu'il faut decouvrir si l'on veut comprendre la véritable histoire de la Ré volution³⁴.' But in fact what really were these chimerique forces? Did Ferrero give to his own questions satisfactory answers, besides this aforementioned generality ? Yes, he did. In his theory we find a distinction between two kinds of revolution: 1. the revolution constructive ( la révolution constructice ) 2. the revolution destructive (la revolution destructice)³⁵. What are the main charasteristics of these two kinds of revolution ? The constructive revolution is lasting for centuries giving new orientation points for the society. The destructive revolution is just the opposite; a brief and devastating phenomenon, because it destroys the existing old legitimation and does not substitute it with a new one. These two variations of revolution can emerge alone or together. In the French Revolution the both variations took place overlapping each other. This phenomenon resulted in fatal consequences: the forces of destructive revolution distorted and paralysed the forces of constructive revolution. In this contradiction Ferrero discovered the key for French Revolution³⁶.
Comparing Bibó's theory with Ferrero's it is not too hard to detect the parallels. We could see earlier Bibó' evaluation on the double nature of the French Revolution. In fact, he made a distinction between the social development of the Netherlands, England and France. In England and the Netherlands the revolutions did not demolished the medieval social development. Just the opposite: metaphorically they crowned it. So, these countries had good luck, because they could avoid the devastating storm of destructive revolution,which in France proclaimed the total annihilation of the Past: ' It cannot be emphasized strongly enough how important it was that as early as the second half of the 16th and, above all, during the 17th century, Holland developed a society possessed of broad liberties unmatched throughout Europe....By the way, it was this Dutch example that inspired the revolutions both in England and in America, and it was the model for all bourgeois societies born in a similar manner. The primary accomplishement of these revolutions was that they removed royal authority,or reduced it to a symbolic level. They also allowed the aristocracy to survive in a society where emphasis was continuosly shifting toward city dwellers... Both the Dutch and the English revolutions - as well as the earlier Swiss one -were organic outgrowths of medieval constitutional categories³⁷.'
So, these revolutions did not demolish the dynastic legitimation, but safeguarded it. This process spiritualized the royal power, and did not try to realize extreme, unattainable aims, so it did not awake the monster of revolutionary violance. Bibó warned the leader: if a revolution needs too much violance, it signs, that there is something wrong with its declared aims. The participants of Dutch and English revolutions did not want to realize impossible things, and they did not arouse the spirit of fear. The spirit of fear- this is a key notion in Ferrero's books as well. The French historian's interpretation is based on this notion. In his theory the most fateful consequence of the French Revolution was this spirit of fear. This fear compelled the French Revolutionists to conduct war against Europe. This fear gave birth to the Napoleonic dictatorship. This fear proved contagious: the other European countries contracted it. The process culminated in a war on European scale. The main consequence was the deterioration of balance for European powers³⁸.

III. Historical lessons for peacemakers:the Peace Treaty of Versailles and the Peace Treaty of Vienna.

Earliey I mentioned, that the two European Peace Treaties, the Peace Treaty of Vienna and the Peace Treaty of Versailles play a very important and determining role in European history. We saw, that Bibó refused the deterministic explaining schemes of history,and emphasized the human responsibility in political decisions. This responsibility is heightened in connenction with the peace conferences, because these events usually determine the way of history for a long time. These processes of peace-making take place in a 'fluid period', when new horizons open before the social development and international relations. This means great historical chances which can be grasped ,or can be failed by the participants. Bibó called peacemaking a kind of art which needs numerous prerequisites. First of all, the peacemakers must abandon the commonly accepeted illusion, according to which the brutal physical force, and military predominance can solve everything. Bibó in a detailed acute minded analysis proved that peace based on military violence never can enjoy a great durability. In other words the winners can not impose their will on the losers. Bibó emphasized, that in the 17th-18th centuries, the European diplomacy had built a cultured and sophisticated way for war and peace as well. These methods were part of a political culture, which was rooted partly in the state theories of Christianity, partly in the right of nature³⁹. But what were the main charasteristics of this political culture ? ' In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,the principle of monarchic-feudal legitimacy could create a relatively high level of stable European order. This order had, as shown by Guglielmo Ferrero,its own legitimate base - the divine right of kings...The sovereign was free to cede part of his territorries as it was held that he had the right to dispose of the loyalties of his subjects.. War was the only means of settling a territorial dispute, and from the mid-seventeeth century up to the French Revolution, warfare became formalised in the manner of a duel. In comparison with the later wars the destructive impact was limited by fighting with small professional armies and war was not intended to annihilate the enemy...The victor did not go to extremies in exploiting his military triumph and was usually satisfied with a favourable settlement of the original dispute -the defeated would give up the disputed area and in most cases resign himself to the new situation⁴⁰.' So, this way of making war and peace was an important achievement of European civilization which made human life more bearable. The first fission of these methods was made by Frederick the Great, the Prussian king, who conducted a war against the Hapsburg empire for possesing Silesia, which was one of the richest and most developed provinces of the Empire. This was the war of the Austrian Succession (1740-1748). This was the first attempt for a long time of sweeping aside the method of dynastic argumentation by which the monarchs previously justified their wars. Frederick the Great did not have any dynastic justification for this war. The justification was in this case the cynical principle of 'might is right', which in Bibó's interpretation is always a symptom of crisis.
This crisis was deepened by the French Revolution which introduced the practice of revolutionary wars based on compulsory military service. This cancelled the 'civilised way of warfare', because the war became inspired by mass emotions, and ceased to be the cause of military-aristocratic elites. Certainly,this development lessened the chance of reasonable emotionless peacemaking. This fact came to light during the Napoleonic wars. Napoleon after his brilliant victories imposed the peace conditions on the defeated party, so his peace constructions could not guarantee lasting peace. Practically , Napoleon did not take into consideration the requirements of European power balance. He wanted to disarm and paralyse the Hapsburg Monarchy which was a vitally important element of this balance. But in the long run this proved more harmful for the European conditions, that the French Emperor had won the Prussian army and forced Prussia into the position of a humiliated satellite state. By his step he had awaked the 'Erbfeind-complex' in the Prussians, and this complex was accompanying the French-German relationship during more than a hundred years. But the principle of dynastic succession, and the aristocratic world-order,which was established on it essentially ruled Europe up to the First World War. The Peace Treaty of Vienna was the reconstruction and reshaping of the world based on this principle.
The Peace Conference of Vienna (1814-15)
Ferrero wrote a whole book dedicated to this peace conference, entitled Reconstruction , which deeply influenced Bibó's intellectual development. Here the French historian explained a complete philosophy of history, in the centre of it posing the notion of legitimation. In the preface of his work we find a dramatical description of European crisis. ( The book first time was published in 1940 ) Here the last century was presented as a series of failures and disappointments. The beginning of this cul de sack was the French Revolutions which discredited the old notions of law, justice and legitimation. The breaking out of the war in 1914 was only the last consequence of a long historical process, in which the distinction between the reality and the illusions had disappeared. Only few people could learn from the bitter lessons of the First World War. Many people were not able to face the reality. But pursuing of dreams had led to a new catastrophe, wrote Ferrero in a disillusioned manner in Geneva on 31 December, 1939. The Second World War had broken out four months earlier. What began the distortion of European history ? - this is the basic question of his book, in which the author gave a detailed answer to this question. History is ruled by two principles: 1. the spirit of adventure [l'esprit d'aventure] 2. the spirit of construction [l'esprit constructif] These principles are continuosly replacing each other during history. In an age of spirit of adventure the old institutions and values are questioned, and the world is dominated by unquietness. The people run into obscure adventures without consideration. In an age of spirit of construction a world-order is established or reestablished: it happens partly with new institutions and values, partly with old ones. Undoubtedly, the French Revolution was a watershed between two ages. For Ferrero it was the period of great fear [le grande peur]. The whole French society was in the paralysing and demoralizing state of fear⁴¹. The king was afraid of the constitutional assembly, and the constitutional assembly was afraid of the king. The French country was terrified by misterious robber bands, and the landlords feared their serfs. Fear is a devastating social phenomenon, because it gives an inpetus to a self-feeding process. Fear always gives birth to fear. It means the start of the vicious cycle of fear, which unleashes the endless stream of violence in society. In Ferrero's interpretation the French Revolution was a lofty example of this vicious cycle. Fear degrades human beings to animals, because they lose their intellectual abilities, and try to solve everything with violence. Finally, fear had destroyed the institution of kingdom ,so the legal power ceased to exist in France for more than 20 years. The Jacobins' dictatorship, the Directory and Bonaparte's ruling were equally illegal powers. For Ferrero the phenomenon of unlimited war deduced as well from the fear of these illegal powers.The French Revolution tried to borrow courage from terror inside and the wars outside. The war lost its limited duel-like manner and became a destroying mass war.
In Ferrero's argumentation the most fatal consequence of fear was the elimination of legal power. Dealing with the problem of legitimation Ferrero strongly emphasized Talleyrand's role in these chaotic years. We know, that according to the commonly shared opinion Talleyrand was a chameleon. Ferrero strongly refused this view. In his opinion Talleyrand was the man of construction in an age of adventure. Ferrero pointed out, that this French politician was the one who first had dealt with the problem of legitimation. He in his Memoires continued the traditions of the 18th century. He made a clear distinction between legal power and usurpation [l'usurpation]. Usurpation is dangerous not only for internal affairs, but for international relationships as well. First of all the illegal power is always in the state of continuos fear. This kind of power is always in fear because of its survival. Terror is the overconpensation of this existential fear. The guillotine was simply the embodiment of this fear. Usurpation poisons the international affairs, and deteriorates the balance of powers, because it tends to be a conquering power. The Napoleon's case shows, that the tranquillity aquired under such a dictatorship is always a transitional phenomenon and besides this is always based on violance. Usurpation is essentially weak. But it is aware of its weakness, and this fact makes it an extremely dangerous social phenomenon.
What are the essential features which separate the legal power from usurpation? Talleyrand in his work emphasized that the main charasteristics of the legal power, that it is commonly accepted by the majority of the given society. At first sight it seems to be a commonplace,moreover it seems to be unsatisfactory for making a valid distinction beteween the legal power and the usurpation. What happens if usurpation is commonly accepted by the society ? It is impossible, argues Ferrero interpreting Talleyrand's thoughts, because historical examples show that when the military predominance has collapsed, the usurper loses its power. Ferrero posed the question: what the factors are like that can give solid ground for the righteuos power? His answer is the next: violence can be avoided only by power if it is based on laws⁴². This answer does not solve the problem, but involves another question: in which way can these laws be grounded ? In other words it is the problem of source for legitimation. In the Western world - gives the answer Ferrero - there are two sources of legitimation: 1. the succession of power. This means that the ruler inherits its power from a predeccesor. In the European Middle Ages it appeared in the guise of a dynastic succession. At last, in this case the law is the law of God. The monarch must rule in concord with the divine laws. In an opposite case this legal power becomes an usurpation, and the ruler can be called to responsibility for his unjust misdeeds. 2. the theory of election. This means that the political leaders gain their power from the society. The source of power in this case is the people. The election does not need a divine confirmation.
Ferrero emphasized,that in the ' Western World ' the combination of these principles was prevailing during the 19th century⁴³. But in this century the dynastic principle yet proved stronger than the principle of election.Ferrero payed his respect to Talleyrand, because he had already recognised the validity of principle for an election at the beginning of the 19th century.
Ferrero strongly emphasized that Talleyrand's conception of law had been deeply rooted in the 18th century. The Age of Enlightement strongly believed, that the law is first of all moral law. In the 19th century the law was conceived which essentially belongs to the field of jurisprudence. According to the theories of the Enlightenment the positive law must be grounded on the law of nature. Between the positive law and the law of nature in these theories exists a mediate sphere: the law of the people, which was commonly accepted in the international affairs, in spite of the fact, that it was not a written law.
Ferrero, interpreting Talleyrand's conception, bumped into the problem of duration of power-exercising.Talleyrand explained that the legitimation of a given power depends on the duration of the existence of power. In other words, in Talleyrand's theory the time is a legitimatising factor. This conception is rooted in the law of property, in which the possesion of a given property for a long time makes the possesor the owner of that property. Ferrero did not shared this opinion, but he remarked that at the beginning every power is an illegal power, and it can aquire legality, if it can keep in life for a relatively long time. But the long duration of power - for Ferrero - is a necessary but not satisfactory prerequisite. Ferrero here reminds us to historical examples. The Directory of French Revolution would have not been able to become a legal power, not even if it had occupied its position for a long time. It was so, because all deeds it performed, falsified the idea of people's sovereignity. The election can not legitimise the power if the result of the election destroys the ground of legitimation,i.e. the popular's sovereignity. In the case of the Directory the governing body liquidated the principle of popular's overeignitys⁴⁴. Ferrero extended the question of duration as a legitimatising factor to the totalitarian states. It is not suprising, if we take into consideration when he was writting this work. He declared, that the totalitarian states would not aquire legitimation, not even if there had existed for centuries. He praised Talleyrand, because he had pointed out to the genuine cause of fear filling whole Europe during the Napoleonic wars. This cause was the fear, which rooted in spreading illegal powers. Napoleon created artificial states everywhere, and presented the title of 'king' to his relatives. Bibó had to deal with the problem of legitimatising factors after the Second World War when Hungary was in its ruins, and because of the collapse of the old Horthy-regime there was not a functioning political power. In December 1944 in Debrecen a Provisional National Assembly was formed which nominated a Provisional Government. But were these instititions legal ? - posed the question István Bibó. In this case it was not only a theoretical problem, but a vitally important practical issue. In his answewr Bibó pointed out - in a similar way like Ferrero did it - that there are not formal criteria for deciding that a government is legal or illegal⁴⁵. It always depends on the actual conditions. The most important factor is the prestige of the given government. The government is self-confident, and trusts its own strength, only if it can be backed up by legality. It seems to be a vicious circle, because in such situations like there was in Hungary in 1944, legality is lacking. In this case - declared Bibó - the ultimate force is the public conviction. In other words the crucial issue is that the new political power must be in concord with the actually accepted principle of legitimation, and in lack of this principle the government can get the protection of public opinion by its own achievements.
Naturally, this problem becomes acute, when the old principle of legitimation has lost partly or entirely its validity and a new one has not yet replaced it. Thus the state of destroying fear, which distorts the society's mentality and at last its structures as well. Talleyrand's merit was - in Ferrero's argumentation - that he found a way-out the from the vicious circle of fear. This was the way of reformation for the principles of legitimation. But before this reformation the Peace Conference of Vienna had to eliminate the false legitimations which were the consequences of the French Revolution.

IV. The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies.

Bibó summarized the results of the Congress of Vienna in the following way: ' The Congress of Vienna had little trouble in imposing the system of monarchic legitimacy on a war-weary Europe. As Ferrero so accurately points out, it was at this time that the enormously intricate web of legitimate territorial changes was contrived within the framework of a unified monarchic European 'Common Law'. The crux of the system was that all territory held without legal justification must be returned to its legitimate ruler and that the only legitimate method of such change was through orderly treaties between their rulers.The fate of such territories as were left without legitimate rulers would be decided by the comnmunity of European rulers... Its greatest succes was the frequent gathering together of the leading European statesmen which was necessitated by the principles laid down at the Congress.This led to the 'European Concert of Powers' of the nineteenth century ⁴⁶....'
The main issue in the above cited quotation is the cooperation of powers on the conference of Vienna. The diplomats recognised that the peace can not be a peace imposed upon the vanquished countries. Ferrero emphasized, that the good peace is a result of compromise between violence and consensus. Peace has to give advantages to the losers as well, and it can not be exclusively on military predominance. An advantegious peace becomes a moral obligation for the defeated party as well. But this needs a much greater amount of courage from the conquerors as well. They are not afraid of appearance being weak because they have got concessions⁴⁷.
However, the Conference of Vienna was based on the mentality of the 18th century, when the theory that the conquest cannot have resulted in the changing of sovereignty that had been commonly accepted. This principle went together with another one - which I mentioned earlier - it was the theory and practice of a limited and mannered dual-like war before the French Revolution . The maxim laid down by Montesquieau proved vitally important in the mentality in the Age of Reason: in peace the most possible good must be done, in peace the least possible harm must be done ['...que les diverses nations doivent se faire dans la paix le plus de bien, et dans la guerre le moins de mal qu'il est possible⁴⁸..'].
The most important factor in international relationships is the existence of common values. These values create the prerequisite of the common language which makes grounds for successful bargaining and compromises. In the 18th century the Common Law and the Law of People could fulfil the function of common values. But,this common basis was weakened by the Napoleonic wars. In Ferrero's interpretation Talleyrand was the diplomat who had recognised this fact, and drew the necessary conclusions. He made a distinction between the dead ineffective principles of legitimation and the living vigorous effective ones. In other words, he knew, that it was not satisfactory to revive the principle of dynastic legitimation, because it would be an ineffective factor, but must strengthen this principle with the principle of people's sovereignty. Bibó basically accepted Ferrero's argumentation in connection with Talleyrand's role on the Peace Conference of Vienna. Moreover, he drew a parallel between the Peace Conference of Vienna, and the Peace Conference of Versailles, and pointed out, that in 1814-15, in Vienna the principle of legitimacy gave a solid ground for a successful and lasting peace constructions. In 1920, in Versailles did not exist a such like commonly accepted principle, so the participants were not able to lay the grounds for a solid and lasting peace. This evaluation does not mean, that Bibó did not critisize some aspects of the Peace Treaty of Vienna. Conversely: he emphasized, that this conference failed to solve the problems of the German unity and that of Polish independence⁴⁹. But in spite of this undeniable fact this peace conference was able to prevent a total European war for a century. This was mainly thanks to the principle of historical legitimacy, invented by Talleyrand, and accepted by the Congress of Vienna: ' It was thanks to that principle that,following the peace treaty of Paris ans the Congress of Vienna,Europe soon recovered,and the accused and defeated France resumed its normal position in the concert of Europe. In the area of domestic politics,the idea of freedpom suffered a temporary setback,but beginning with 1830 it gained increasing power and achieved stable results,the invisible support of which was the permanence of the system established in 1815. That system survived the series of crises occuring between 1848 and 1871 with corrections being made in certain of its aspects and deterioration in certain others; on the whole,however,it remained alive until 1914 and in the end it guaranted a hundred year period for Europe during which peace was the overwhelming norm and war the exception⁵⁰.'
Nothwithstanding, Bibó emphasized that the atmosphere of the Conference of Vienna was not without troubles and disturbances: fear was not absent, but the participants were able to rise above it,and in the crucial moments the spirit of compromise , in Ferrero's term the 'spirit of construction' gained the upper hand. It is worth mentioning that Henry Kissinger in his book, entitled A World restored. Metternich, Castlereagh and the Problems of Peace, 1812-1822 as highly evaluated the results of the Peace Conference of Vienna, as had done Ferrero and Bibó before.
Ferrero in his works was continously emphasizing the parallels between the disturbances and anomalies of the aera of the French Revolution and of our times. For instance, - because Napoleon was the son of the French Revolution - the Napoleonic state in his interpretation was the archetype of modern totalitarian states. Napoleon had pushed the parliament to the background, and had eliminated the liberty of press, as later the Italian dictator , Mussolini did it in 1924⁵¹. Ferrero positing face to face Napoleon and Talleyrand declared, that the emperor had been the embodiment of the 'spirit of adventure', Telleyrand had been the embodiment of the 'spirit of construction'. In other words Napoleon was the eternal illusionist [un éternel illusioniste], Talleyrand was the genuine realist [un veritable réaliste]⁵². This opposition reminds us to Bibó's twin-notions: ' the false realist ' [hamis realista], and ' the exalted clairvoyant' [túlfeszült lényeglátó].In Bibó's argumentation the false realist the person who accepts the requirements of a deadlock, and moves easily within the boundaries of it. The false realist is unable to recognise that his/her reality is a false reality. For Bibó, for example, Bismarck was the archetype of the false realist. The exalted clairvoyant - in Bibo's term - clearly recognises the fact of the deadlock. But he/she cannot get next the political power, because he/she is unable to accept the commonly accepted fears and illusions of the society. This phenomenon had became very charasteristic in Central and Eastern Europe after the First World War - emphasized Bibó.
In 1920 during the Peace Conference of Versailles the situation was dramatically different in comparison with the situation of Europe during the Peace Conference of Vienna. The Law of Nature and the Law of People were not any more commonly accepted grounds for a successful peace treaty. In Bibó's theory this was the ultimate root of the paralysis of international institutions. Without commonly accepted values the principles of legitimation could not function either. The dynastic principle had lost its vigour and the people's sovereignty could not take over its position perfectly. According to Bibó's opinion in the field of peacemaking in a modern representative democracy falls short to the old outmoded dynastic system. Among the causes of the First World War - following Bibó's argumentation - was one of the most important ones, that during the 19th century, after the Peace Conference of Vienna the principle of dynastic succession and the principle of people's sovereignty were intertwined in a fatal manner. Bibó enumerated the Bismarckian German Empire and the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy as the lofty examples if this intertwining. And what was the result ? ' Both rulers and nations were motivated by a sense of uncertainty,partly from the threats to their existence and partly from the idiosyncratic nature of their alliance with each other, but neither had any interest in or liking for war. Hoeever,to compensate for their uncertainties,both dynasties and national movements put on a display of sword rattling,fictitious resoluteness⁵³. 'At last, this miserous combination led to an totally meaningless war:' Never before, perhaps, was a war fought in such confusion as regards its ultimate goals. Apart from Serbia and Belgium,there was hardly a country, hardly a people that knew what it was fighting for⁵⁴.' However, after the First World War the dynastic legitimation was replaced by the people's sovereignty, and the balance of power was replaced by the League of Nations. But the new system was unable to function smoothly. That fact was justified by the second world war. In fact the new international system was based on three basic principles : 1. the principle of people's sovereignty. 2. the principle of self-determination. 3. the principle of territorial integrity. The main problem, that these three notions oppose each other. This contradiction became very acute in the Central and Eastern European Countries which were entities with mixed populations, so the ethnic borders and state borders are different. This situation is rooted in the miserable Versailles Peace Treaties which cut the many-ethnic Austro-Hungarian Empire into small but many-ethnic countries. When Bibó, in the 1960-70's was writing The paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies, his main motif was the increasing number of unsettled international disputes. Of course, he thought primarily of the non-European problems, like were Cyprus, and Israel, but clearly evident, that his theory is applicable for the Central and Eastern European situation, which has emerged recently, after the collapse of the USSR and the disintegration of former Yugoslavia. Otherwise, we cannot forget that Bibó in The Distress of the East European Small States brilliantly analysed the miserable situation of this region. The later work The Paralysis... gave the theoretic grounds to the empirical description of The Distress... but in the 1960-70's a sane man could not be able to foresee the dramatic changes of 1989-90. The Balkanic war among the former member states of Yugoslavia makes Bibó's train of thought on the international disputes and the troubles of nation formation in the mixed populated areas very timely. However, Bibó mentioned three factors which can prevail, or at least lessen such like conflicts: 1. the well-functioning international organization 2. the concert of major powers 3.the commonly accepted international arbitration. Really, these factors are in a complementary relationship with each other. The well-functioning international organisation cannot be imaginable without the concert of the major powers. And these first two factors give the gorund for the successful international arbitration. Bibó indicated certainly, that there are very grave practical or technical problems here, for example: the question of the international military forces, and the hardships of peace-keeping etc. But we must keep in mind, that the most important thing is the existence of the commonly accepted values. However, now we have arrived to a vitally important issue: the relationship between the interest and moral values in the international community. This problem is in connection with the question of relationship between power and morals in the European development: this is the intellectual centre of Bibó's social philosophy.

V. Principles and institutions, relationship between power and human morals: can power be humanized ?

Let us remember, that for Bibó the European development is essentially the lessening of the amount of violence. This change is unimaginable without morals. This does not mean a plain moralising. Bibó clearly conceived that human societies cannot exist without human interests. But he denied the exclusively prevailing role of human interest in this social life. If it happened, it would be a self-destroying process which would eliminate human life. He was deeply convinced that mere interest-enforcement and naked violence cannot be applied as explaining principles for the history of societies. When naked force and brutal violence dominate the social life, this fact is always the sign of a deep crisis. According to Bibó, this maxim is true in inner policy and international relationships as well. The history of European civilization is the history of gradual humanization of power. Notwithstanding, he was not a naive idealist. Moral values are neccessary for human society because of practical causes: these are the interests of survival and peaceful human conditions. Besides, moral values must be undertaken by institutions and legal processes: inner and outer violence cannot be prevented by moral maxims.
'In a society, moral obligations acquire their effective power and effective power and interests their moral justification through the social system. In this process rigid demarcations of obligation are softened and the powers of interest and coercion chanelled into the confining but also relieving piupeline of the system,which continues to evolve from this interplay.Though this process, a consensus develops which regards social obligations as practical and necessary.The current chaotic condition of the international community may be ascribed in part a total lack of any such common consensus ... . One viewpoint claims that there is no central power in the international community,only the unlimited self-interest of its components;and that,therefore,unlimited coercion is effective. This view does not allow for any any moral obligations and regards power politics as natural and therefore right.This view,in effectr,the old tenet of vulgar Machiavellianism that is the moral duty of the statesman to act in the interest of his country according to the law of the jungle. The Macchiavellian outlook has lost favour in domestic policy, as it has become inceasingly apparent that it is possible to govern in way which is more moral, human and rational than it was assumed in a system tailor-made for Caesare Borgia⁵⁵.'

Created: 28 November 1998 by Pluhár Emese

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4. Ortega y Gasset: Espana invertebrada, Hungarian translation...17 p.


5. Ibidem .... 19.p.


6. Ibidem... 37.p.


7. Ibidem.. 57.p.


8. Ibidem ...74. p.


9. Elit és szociális érzék [Elites and the sense of social responsibilities] in: Bibó István :Válogatott tanulmányok I. köt. Budapest 1986 ... 225. p.


10. Ibidem.... 226.p.


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12. Oswald Spengler: Der Untergang des Abendlandes I. Band, München 1924....4.p.


13. Ibidem...27.p.


14. Ibidem... 41.p.


15. Ibidem...43.p.


16. Ortega y Gasset: Espana invertebrada, Hungarian translation..125. p.


17. Ibidem... 133.p.


18. Bibó István: A pénz [The money], in: Bibó István: Válogatott tanulmányok I. köt....211-212.p.
19. Bibó István: A pénz, [The money] ,in: Bibó István: Válogatott tanulmányok I. köt. 214. p.


20. Oswald Spengler: Der Untergang.... II. Band... 599.p.


21. Bibó István: A pénz [The money], in: Bibó István: Válogatott tanulmányok. I. köt....219. p.


22. Istvan Bibo: The Paralysis of InternationalInstitutions and the Remedies, The Harvester Press, 1976


23. Guglielmo Ferrero: La ruine de la civilisati;on antique,Hungarian translation by Scmidt József, Budapest 1993..12.p.


24. Ibidem...16-17.pp.


25. Ibidem..28 p.


26. Ibidem...75.p.


27. Ibidem...149.p.


28. Bibó István:Az európai egyensulyról és békérõl, in: Bibó István:Válogatott tanulmányok, I. köt...421.p.


29. Bibó István: A nemzetközi államközösség...[The Paralysis..], in: Bibó István: Válogatott tanulmányok IV. köt..285.p


30. In: Max Weber: Rationalisierung und entzauberte Welt /Schriften zu Geschichte und Soziologie/ Verlag Philipp Reclam jun. Leikpzig, 1989, 224-237 pp.


31. Ibidem... 226.p.


32. István Bibó: Reflections on the Social Development of Europe in:István Bibó: Democracy,Revolution, Self-Determination, translated by András Boros-Kazai, Columbia Univ. Press. New York,1991.....449-450.pp.


33. Guglielmo Ferrero: Les deux revolutions francaies 1789-1796,Paris 1951, ...16.p.


34. Ibidem...16-17.p.


35. Ibidem.. 17.p.


36. Guglielmo Ferrero: Reconstruction. Talleyrand a Vienne (1814-15),Paris 1940,..3.p.


37. István Bibó: Reflections on the Social Development of Europe...446.p.


38. Guglielmo Ferrero: Reconstruction...9.p.c


39. Bibó István: Az európai egyensulyról és békérõl [On European balance and Peace] ,in: Bibó István: Válogatott tanulmányok I.köt... 434.p.


40. István Bibó: The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies....17.-18.pp.


41. Guglielmo Ferrero: Reconstruction...4.p.


42. Guglielmo Ferrero: Reconstruction... 52.p.


43. Ibidem....53.p.


44. Ibidem... 56.p.


45. Bibó István: A demokratikus Magyarország államformája. [The Form of State for Democratic Hungary] ,in: Bibó István:Válogatott tanulmányok II. köt... 7.p.


46. István Bibó:The Paralysis of International Institutions and the Remedies...19.-20.pp.


47. Guglielmo Ferrero: Reconstruction....107.-108.pp.


48. Guglielmo Ferrero: Reconstruction...38.p.


49. István Bibó: The Paralysis ... 20.p.


50. István Bibó: The Distress of East European Small States,in:István Bibó É Democracy,Revolution,Self-Determination..76.-76pp.


51. Guglielmo Ferrero: Pouvoir.Les génies invisibles de la cité,Paris,Libraire Plon..8-9pp.


52. Guglielmo Ferrero: Reconstruction..45.p.


53. István Bibó: The Paralysis... 23.p.


54. Ibidem...23p.


55. Ibidem...7.p.