

Libellus pro sapiente—a Criticism of Allan Bäck's
Argument against St. Thomas Aquinas'
Doctrine of the Incarnation

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DISCUSSION ARTICLE I:

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*Cum de Christo loquimur, quid secundum
quid, & propter quid dicatur, prudens &
diligens ac pius lector intelligere debet.¹*

Allan Bäck offers the following argument "leading to a contradictory conclusion from premises apparently drawn from the Christian doctrine of the Incarnation":

1. God is the Creator
2. Christ is God
3. Christ is man (Christ is a man)
4. Man is created (Whatever is a man is created)
5. The Creator is not created (Whatever is the Creator is not created)
6. Thus, Christ is the Creator (1,2)
7. Thus, Christ is not created (5,6)
8. Thus, Christ is created (3,4)
9. Thus, Christ is created and not created (7,8)²

First, I'd like to point out that the argument, if valid, does not lead to a contradictory conclusion, and that, *Principia Mathematica* notwithstanding, it is not valid.³ Then I intend to show

¹Petrus Lombardus, *Libri Quattuor Sententiarum*, lb. 3. ds. 11., in: *Patrologiae Cursus Completus, Series Latina/PL*; Tom. CXVII, coll. 778-789. Cf. St. Augustine, *De Trinitate*, lb. 1. c. 13., in: S. Aurelii Augustini Opera Omnia, PL, Tom. XLII, col. 840.

²Allan Bäck, "Aquinas on the Incarnation," *The New Scholasticism*, LVI, 2 (Spring, 1982) p. 128.

³Bäck also supplies two formalized versions of the argument. But since my criticism concerns the sense of the predicates used in the argu-

how the solutions offered by Aquinas yield the same result, and so, how, against Bäck's claim, Aquinas solves this alleged paradox of the Incarnation without getting entangled in other inconsistencies.

In support of the fourth premise of his argument, Bäck puts forward the following lemma:

- a. Whatever is a man has humanity essentially
- b. Humanity is different from divinity
- c. Whatever is different from divinity is created
- d. If *x* has *Y* essentially, then whatever is true of *Y* essentially is a property of *x*
- e. Thus, humanity is created (b,c)
- f. Thus, whatever is a man is created (a,d,e)⁴

The tender spot of the lemma is premise d. Aquinas certainly would not accept it, and indeed, it cannot be accepted in this general form. E.g. man has soul essentially, and it is essentially true of the soul that it is a form.⁵ But being a form cannot be a property of man, because form is an integral part of man, and "nulla pars integralis praedicatur de suo toto", as the schoolman put it.⁶ Again, the Son has essentially the divine nature, and the divine nature has essentially the property of being identical with the Father,⁷ but it cannot be stated that the Son is identical with

ment, in the first approach it has nothing to do with a formalism which leaves just the sense of the predicates out of consideration. Some problems with Bäck's formalization, however, will be considered at the end of the paper.

⁴ Bäck, p. 129. The substitution of 'd.' for 'b.' in the last line in the parenthesis is my correction, the occurrence of 'b.' here in the original is certainly a misprint.

⁵ Cf. fn. 34, and St. Thomas, *Summa Theologiae* (ST) 1,q.76,a.1; *In I Sententiarum* (1SN) d.19,q.4,a.1,obj.3; in 4. *Sententiarum* (4SN) d.43,q.1,a.1a.resp.4; *Summa contra Gentiles* (ScG) 1b.2,c.56 & sqq; *Questio de Anima* (QDA), a.1.a.2, in: *S. Thomae Aquinatis Opera Omnia* (Stuttgart-Bad Cannstadt, 1980). Further references, if not otherwise indicated, are to this edition. Further references to single works will be made by means of the abbreviations put in parentheses after their titles at their first occurrence.

⁶ See e.g. St. Thomas, *In libros Metaphysicorum* (CMP) 1b.7,1c.9; 1SN, d.25,q.1,a.1.resp.2; *De Ente et Essentia*, c.3.

⁷ Cf.: "... cum dicitur, Deus vel divina essentia est Pater est praedicatio per identitatem, non autem sicut inferioris de superiori, quia in divinis

the Father for it would be to subscribe to the Sabellian heresy.⁸

The number of similar counterexamples can be multiplied at will. But if premise d. does not generally hold, how can we decide whether or not it holds in this or that, or in any case at all? For the sake of argument let's suppose that it holds for any substance *x*, for any nature *Y*, and for the property 'created'. In this case premise d. will sound like this: "if *x* has nature *Y* essentially, then if it is essentially true of *Y* that it is created, then *x* is created", that is, "if *x* has essentially a created nature, then *x* is created."⁹ But since humanity is created, and if *x* is a man, then *x* has humanity essentially, therefore we get the desired conclusion, that if *x* is a man, then *x* is created, for any *x*.

But now it is clear, that in this context 'x is created' cannot imply more than 'x has a created nature', since 'x is created' is implied exactly by 'x has a created nature'. That is, if premise d. is to be true, then its consequent, 'x is created', cannot be used in a sense according to which it would imply 'x has a created nature and doesn't have an uncreated nature' (and so, if applied to Christ, would express the Arian heresy).¹⁰ For, if 'x is created' in this context implied 'x has a created nature and doesn't have an uncreated nature', then, by transitivity of implication, 'x has a created nature' would have to imply 'x has a created nature and doesn't have an uncreated nature'.¹¹ Therefore in this context

non est universale et singulare. Unde, sicut est per se ista Pater est Deus, ita et ista Deus est Pater, et nullo modo per accidens." ST 1,q.39,a.6 ad 2um. See further: 1SN,d.4,q.2,a.2.

⁸ Cf. e.g. ScG, 1b,4,c.5.

⁹ For the sake of brevity, in the following considerations the adverb (essentially) will be omitted. Later on I will examine in any case whether or not St. Thomas is committed to hold that Christ has human nature only accidentally.

¹⁰ Without going into the dogmatic subtleties concerning the real nature of Arianism, the term 'Arian heresy' will be used to designate the opinion expounded by St. Thomas in ScG, 1b,4,c.6.

¹¹ To be more clear if possible, let me restate the argument in a quasi-formal way: If we accept premise d. for any substance *x*, for any nature *Y*, and for the property 'created', as we did, we have to accept 1. 'x has a created nature → x is created', because 1. in this case is equivalent to premise d. But if this is so, we cannot accept 2. 'x is created → x has a created nature & x does not have an uncreated nature', for, by transitivity of implications, 1. and 2. entails 3. 'x has a created nature → x has

'x is created' can, and indeed *does*, imply no more than 'x has a created nature'. But since in this context 'x is created' implies and is implied by 'x has a created nature', it follows that 'x is created' in this context must be used in a sense according to which it is *equivalent* to 'x has a created nature'. So, if equivocation is to be avoided, the conclusion of the lemma and consequently premise 4. of the argument must be equivalent to 'Whatever is a man has a created nature'. Therefore, in the conclusion of the argument, 'Christ is created' must be equivalent to 'Christ has a created (namely human) nature', the contradictory of which is 'Christ does not have a created nature', and not 'Christ has an uncreated nature'. But in the second half of the conclusion, 'Christ is not created' must be equivalent to the latter, because this implies and is implied by 'Christ is God', that is, his having an uncreated nature. So, in the conclusion of the argument, 'Christ is created' and 'Christ is not created' must be used in senses according to which they are equivalent to 'Christ has a created nature' and 'Christ has an uncreated nature' respectively. But since the latter are not contradictory, neither are the former. So, if we accept the lemma as a valid proof of premise 4. of the argument, and also accept the argument as valid (as not committing the fallacy of equivocation), then we have to accept that the conclusion of the argument, despite all appearances, is not contradictory.

In the preceding considerations it was supposed that premise d. of the lemma is true. But we saw that it can be true only if its antecedent determines the sense of its consequent. So, premise d. cannot be accepted unless it is understood with this determination. Now, it is exactly in this way that Aquinas treats the original of premise d. in the context from which it was extracted. In his response to the objection in which the original of premise d.¹² occurs, he says: "omnes proprietates humanae naturae, sicut et divinae, possunt *aliqua* dici de Christo. . . . Sed tamen illa quae dubi-

a created nature & x does not have an uncreated nature'. But 3. cannot be true, so 1. and 2. cannot both be true at the same time. Therefore, having accepted 1., we cannot accept 2.

¹² "Proprietates utriusque naturae possunt praedicari de hypostasi communi utriusque naturae, quocumque nomine significatur". ST 3,q.16, a.8,obj.2.; cf. Bäck, p. 129, fn. 3.

tationem habent circa alterutram naturam, non sunt dicenda absque determinatione".¹³ That is, if there is no explicit indication of the determination of the consequent's sense in premise d., then it is to be rejected as false unless it is understood with determination.¹⁴ So, if we accept premise d. in the lemma, in the argument we cannot validly infer that Christ is created unless it is understood with determination; but if it is so understood, the contradiction is merely apparent, as we could see. On the other hand, since in the argument there is no explicit indication of this determination, and consequently nothing constrains the corresponding interpretation, which would render the argument valid, it follows that the argument is not valid.¹⁵

Bäck intended to show that Aquinas must have used propositions with qualifications in order to avoid contradictions emerging from arguments like his. What I intended to show was that it is rather Bäck who should have used propositions with qualifications in order to save his argument as valid, in which case, however, he could not have saved the conclusion as contradictory.

But Bäck argues further that if Aquinas succeeds in avoiding contradiction by using propositions of this kind, then, according to his own analyses of such propositions, he is committed to hold that Christ has human nature only accidentally, which, nevertheless, he (Aquinas) explicitly denies. So, according to Bäck, St. Thomas sidesteps the trap of one inconsistency only to be entrapped by another.

I have argued that Bäck's argument could be valid only if it used propositions with qualifications, or if it were understood as if it used propositions with qualifications, and that if in this way it were valid, then it would not lead to a contradictory conclusion.

¹³ ST 3,q.16,a.8 ad 2um.

¹⁴ Cf. Petrus Lombardus, *op. cit.* d.11.; St. Thomas, ST 3,q.16,a.8 ad 1um; Duns Scotus, *In Tertium Librum Sententiarum* (3SN), d.11,q.1., in: J. Duns Scotus, *Opera Omnia* (Hildesheim, 1969), vol. XI.1.; St. Bonaventure, *In Tertium Librum Sententiarum* (3SN) d.11,a.2,q.1., Editio Quaracchi, tom. 3.; St. Albert the Great, *Scriptum Tertium Super Tertium Librum Sententiarum* (Basel, 1506), d.11.a.4.

¹⁵ Cf. Peter of Spain, *Tractatus* (Assen, 1972), tract VII. §§ 127-128, p. 160; St. Thomas, ST 3,q.16,a.10 ad 3um; Duns Scotus, 3SN,d.11,q.2 ad 1um; St. Bonaventure, 3SN,d.11,a.2,q.1. ad argumenta.

I have also indicated that Aquinas' treatment of the original of premise d. is in the fullest accord with this result. What remained to be shown is how Aquinas' analyses of propositions with qualifications yield the same result without committing him to hold that Christ has human nature accidentally.

Bäck contends that if Aquinas admits the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inference from 'Christ *qua* man is a creature' to 'Christ is a creature' then he is back again in contradiction, while if he doesn't admit this inference, then he is committed to hold that Christ has human nature accidentally. What I have to show is 1) that even if Aquinas admitted the above inference, he wouldn't be back again in contradiction; 2) that his reasons for rejecting this inference are essentially the same which I have given against Bäck's argument; 3) that he can reject this inference without being committed to hold that Christ has human nature only accidentally.

1) It was a *distinctio communis* among the schoolman that propositions with qualifications are of two types. Propositions of the one type are those in which the qualification diminishes the concept to which it is added. Propositions of the other type are those in which the qualification does not diminish the concept to which it is added.¹⁶ The proposition 'Christ *qua* man is a creature', or 'Christ with respect to his human nature is a creature' is unequivocally treated by St. Thomas as pertaining to the first type.¹⁷ It was also commonly held that, if understood as pertaining to the first type, this proposition does not imply the proposition 'Christ is a creature' and is admissible as true.¹⁸ According to the schoolmen it is admissible just because it does not imply that Christ is a creature in the Arian sense, i.e., that he is a pure

¹⁶ Cf. Williams of Shyreswoode, *Introductiones in Logicam*, Sitzungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philologisch-historische Abteilung, Jahrgang 1937, Heft 10. München, pp. 96-97.; Peter of Spain, op. cit. § 120, pp. 167-158; St. Thomas *De Fallacis*, c. 13; St. Bonaventure, 3SN,d.11,dub.2.; Duns Scotus, 3SN,d.11,q.2.; *Questiones Quodlibetales*, ed. cit. vol. XII, q.3.; Cajetan's commentary on *Summa Theologiae*, in: St. Thomas Aquinatis *Opera Omnia*, Editio Leonina, tom. 11., ad ST 3,q.16,a. 10.

¹⁷ Cf. St. Thomas, 3SN,d.11,q.1,a.3.; ST 3,q.16,a.10.

¹⁸ See *loc. cit.* from St. Albert, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas, Duns Scotus and Cajetan.

creature, who lacks an uncreated nature.¹⁹ So, the schoolmen held the qualification in this proposition to be of such nature that it doesn't allow the predicate to imply that Christ does not have an uncreated nature. Consequently, even if the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inference were admitted in this case, still, to avoid equivocation, it could be admitted only if in the *simpliciter* form the predicate were to be understood in the restricted sense. But then, as we could see, there would be no contradiction. To take a similar example, if one half of a shield is black and the other half of it is white, then the following propositions are true: 'This shield with respect to its one half is black' and 'This shield with respect to its other half is white'. From these, however, we cannot infer that this shield is black and white unless we understand the predicates 'black' and 'white' in the former, restricted senses. But in that case they will not exclude each other.²⁰ So much for the case when the proposition in question is understood as pertaining to the first type.

The class of propositions of the second type was, it seems, quite generally held to include the class of propositions in which the qualification functions as the middle term of a syllogism.²¹ In this question, however, I'm inclined to accept Cajetan's position, who, criticizing Duns Scotus, states that the qualification, even if so understood, *can* diminish the concept of the predicate.²² For, if in the proposition 'Christ *qua* man is a creature' the qualification

¹⁹ "Quamvis illud quod convenit parti aliquo modo possit dici de toto, non tamen oportet ut quod removetur a parte, removetur a toto; unde quamvis aethiops secundum dentem habeat albedinem, non potest tamen dici quod sit carens nigredine: quia quod non convenit sibi secundum unam partem, potest sibi convenire secundum aliam; et similiter quamvis Christus sit creatura, secundum quod homo, non tamen potest dici quod, secundum quod homo, careat divinitate quae sibi competit per aliam naturam." St. Thomas, 3SN,d.11,q.1,a.3, resp. 5., cf. *loc. cit.* from the other scholastic doctors as well.

²⁰ Cf. Duns Scotus, *Questiones super Libros Elenchorum*, ed. cit., vol. I,q.54.

²¹ As Duns Scotus expressly writes: "reduplicatio . . . proprie sumpta non diminuit alterum extremorum." (3SN,d.11,q.2. in corp. cf. *loc. cit.* in fn. 16).

²² See Cajetan, *loc. cit.*: ". . . concedimus quod reduplicatio minuit quandoque, quia reduplicat terminum ratione naturae seu formae et non ratione suppositi".

'man' is understood as a middle term of a syllogism, this means that the predicate 'creature' applies to Christ just because it is implied by his having a created, namely human, nature. Therefore it cannot imply more than that, and so we are where we were before.²³

2) It was also commonly held by the schoolmen that with propositions in which the qualification refers to a part of the subject the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inference is valid exclusively in cases where the predicate applies only to that part, and it can apply neither to the whole nor to any other part. In this way the qualification does not diminish the concept of the predicate (since it can apply only to the part anyway), and therefore the whole is *denominated simpliciter* by the predicate.²⁴ I emphasized the term 'denominated' because it is this which Bäck seems to forget in his objection to this rule: "... being a navel is a property true only of one part of a human body, namely the navel. But it is not true that from 'a man in virtue of his navel is a navel' 'a man is a navel' follows, nor is it true, even figuratively, that a man in virtue of his navel is a navel". Taken denomina-

²³ Cf. fn. 11.

²⁴ "Alio autem modo secundum quid non diminuit suum totum, sed ponit ipsum et infert, ut crispus caput; ergo crispus . . . Et hoc est in qualibet forma et quolibet accidente denominante totum per partem, ut crispitudo, quae per caput denominat hominem. . . . Aliae autem formae omnes et accidentia quaecumque sunt formae ipsius totius, ita quod non partis tantum—haec, inquam, omnia non possunt denominare totum, nisi simpliciter insint toti. Et in talibus incidit fallacia secundum quid et simpliciter, quia denominatio quae fit in talibus secundum partem, vel secundum alium respectum, diminuit ipsum simpliciter." Peter of Spain, *op. cit.* tr. 7. §120, p. 167. "... quaedam sunt accidentia quae determinant partes in toto, sicut crispitudo in homine determinat sibi caput, et quod inest isto modo parti potest totum denominare. Sed quaedam accidentia non determinat sibi aliquam partem in toto et quando tale accidens inest parti non oportet quod denominet totum . . . hic non est secundum quid et simpliciter. Est crispus secundum caput; ergo est crispus. Nam ratio secundum quam praedicatum attribuitur subiecto in antecedente non est secundum quid respectu rationis, quia praedicatum attribuitur subiecto in consequente. Unde non secundum plus sit determinatio, dicendo, homo est crispus, quam dicendo homo est crispus secundum caput, et hoc est ex natura specialis eius, quod dico crispus" Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones super Libros Ethicorum*, ed. cit., vol. I, q. 54, ad argumenta; cf. *loc. cit.* fn. 16. and cf. fn. 31

tively: "... it is true that from 'a man in virtue of his navel is naveled' 'a man is naveled' follows, and it is true, not figuratively but properly, that a man in virtue of his navel is naveled".²⁵

Now, as to the proposition in question, Aquinas, and generally the schoolmen, rejected the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inference because the predicate 'creature' can apply both to the nature and to the suppositum, while this suppositum subsists in, what is more, is identical *secundum rem* with the uncreated divine nature, and so, according to the general rule, the suppositum is not to be denominated *simpliciter* by this predicate of its nature. And this is so just because the qualification so restricts the sense of the predicate that the predicate cannot imply that Christ doesn't have an uncreated nature, which, however, in the *simpliciter* form it can, or rather, it does,²⁶ just as in the proposition 'This man is blind with respect to his one eye', the qualification so restricts the sense of the predicate that it cannot imply that this man is totally blind, which, however, in the *simpliciter* form it would.

3) We could see that the criterion according to which the several *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inferences are valid or not has

²⁵ Some other, "classical" examples of the valid *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inferences are the following: "... simitas et aquilitas soli naso insunt et per hoc dicitur homo simus vel aquilus, et cecitas est in oculis et per hoc dicitur homo cecus; et scientia et virtus est in anima ut in subiecto et per hoc dicitur homo sciens vel habens virtutes; et sic de aliis consimilibus quaecumque denominant totum per partem." Peter of Spain, *op. cit.*, tr. 7, §120, p. 167.

²⁶ "... sicut non sequitur, si inferatur: iste est albus secundum pedem, ergo iste est albus; per hunc modum non sequitur: quia esse creatura secundum hominem attribuitur Christo ratione naturae assumtae, prolatum autem simpliciter videtur ei omnino convenire; consuetudo enim est, nomine creaturae ea intelligi, quae omnino inducta sunt de non-esse in esse" (St. Bonaventure, 3SN.d.11,dub.2. Cf. fn. 19).

Another way of analyzing propositions of such type is to say that "Christ *quae* man is a creature" means that Christ's human nature is a creature" (Bäck, p. 138.) Or, as St. Bonaventure puts it with respect to the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inference: "Vel dicatur . . . quod non sequitur . . . quia varietat attributo praedicati, ut cum prius attribuitur humanae naturae postmodum attribuitur divinae personae" (St. Bonaventure, *locus cited*). That is, according to this analysis, 'Christ *quae* man is a creature' is true iff 'Christ's human nature is a creature' is true. But since from the latter it does not follow that Christ is a creature, neither does it from the former.

nothing to do with the essentiality or inessentiality of the part which is referred to in the qualification.²⁷ Bäck's principle, that the type of propositions with qualifications where the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inference does not hold has the feature that the part referred to in the qualification must be accidental to the subject, is based exclusively on the features of those examples which he considers.²⁸ But concerning examples in theology, let me quote St. John Damascene: "*non necesse autem omnifariam et indefectivè assimilari exempla: quod enim omnibus simile idem utique erit. Et maxime in divinis*".²⁹ So it will suffice if I supply some counterexamples. To have a head is not an accidental property of man, as is easily tested by Porphyry's definition of accident: "Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem."³⁰ Therefore, to have a head is an essential property, and so, it seems, the head is an essential part of man. But from 'this African is white with respect to his head' it does not follow that this African is white. And from 'Socrates is round with respect to his head' it doesn't follow that Socrates is round. And it doesn't follow precisely because roundness can apply to Socrates' head and to his whole body as well, nor is the predicate 'round' properly used in 'Socrates is round with respect to his head', but by syncedoché, exactly as Aquinas said.³¹

²⁷ See again the text given in fn. 24.

²⁸ Bäck considers the following examples: 'The African is white with respect to his teeth' and 'Socrates is curly' on the one hand, 'Socrates qua man is rational' and 'The African is black with respect to his body' on the other. (See Bäck, pp. 139-140).

²⁹ St. John Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, lb.3,c.26., as cited by St. Thomas, ST 3,q.2,a.6 ad 1um.

³⁰ Boethius' translation in: *Isagogen Porphyrii Commenta, Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum*, vol. XXXVIII. (Viandobonae, Lipsiae, 1906). Editionis secundae Ib.4,c.17,p.280.

³¹ "Therefore, in virtue of those dispositions which are in the part only, the whole is denominated without qualification and properly through the disposition of the part, when nothing is added, just as a man is called curly; but with regard to those dispositions which naturally agree with the part and the whole, the whole is not denominated by the part without qualification but (only) when the part is added, as when it is said, 'a man is white in virtue of his hair,' and not properly but figuratively through syncedoché." This is Bäck's translation of St. Thomas, 1SN,d.11,q.1,a.3 (Bäck, p. 135). So, it is really a puzzle why Bäck, having trans-

However, the essentiality or inessentiality of the having relation with respect to the part as a criterion for judging whether the part is an essential one is entirely Bäck's invention.³² For Aquinas, the head, neck, eyes, teeth and so on, are equally *partes integrantes*, what is more, *partes quantitatis*, but not *partes essentiales*.³³ For him, the *partes essentiales* are exclusively those which are the constituent parts of the essence, namely, in material beings, matter and form.³⁴

But Bäck's principle does not hold for these parts either. For if we admit, as Aquinas did, the immortality of the soul, we can truly—even if not properly—say that Socrates is still living with respect to his soul. But from this it does not follow that Socrates is still living *simpliciter*. Again, it is because the predicate 'lives' can apply both to the whole (Socrates) and to the part (his soul) that the *secundum quid ad simpliciter* inference is not valid, and that the qualified proposition is a case of syncedoché, exactly as Aquinas said. Lastly, some minor observations are in order.

(1) Bäck has found "no indication in traditional logic that identities are considered to have a logical form different from predications".³⁵ I have found some, let me quote the most perspicuous one: "Dicendum, quod differentia est inter nomina substantiva et adjectiva. Substantiva enim significant non tantum formam, sed etiam suppositum formae, unde possunt praedicari ratione utriusque; et quando praedicantur ratione suppositi, dicitur praedicatio per identitatem; quando autem ratione formae, dicitur per denominationem, sive informationem; et haec est magis propria praedicatio, quia termini in praedicato tenentur formaliter. Adjectiva autem tantum significant formam, et ideo non possunt

lated the whole passage, writes on the next page: "he (Aquinas) says 'Christ has suffered', like 'Socrates is curly' is a case of syncedoché" (p. 136), and later on "Again, 'Socrates is curly with respect to his hair' does not imply, strictly speaking 'Socrates is curly', but only figuratively, by syncedoché" (p. 137).

³² See Bäck, p. 140.

³³ See e.g. St. Thomas, 1SN,d.19,q.4,a.1.obj.3.; CMP. lb.5,c.21., lc.15., ST 1, q.8,a.2 ad 3um.

³⁴ "Creatura habet tantum duas partes essentiales, scilicet materiam and formam." St. Thomas. 1SN,d.3,q.2,a.2.obj.1;cf.4SN,d.43,q.1,a.1.resp.4; QDA, a.10.

³⁵ Bäck, p.128,fn.1.

praedicari, nisi per informationem: unde haec est falsa: essentia est generans; quamvis haec sit vera: essentia est Pater. Cum igitur dicitur Filius Dei est homo, est praedicatio per informationem et identitatem; cum vero dicitur essentia divina est homo est praedicatio per identitatem, quia est idem secundum rem cum supposito hominis, non autem per informationem, quia natura divina non significatur ut suppositum subsistens in human natura".³⁶

(2) At the given locus, I have found no indication of Scotus' alleged claim that "propositions like 'Christ qua man is a creature' must be taken reduplicatively and not specifically."³⁷ On the other hand, in his commentary on the *Sentences*, Scotus explicitly states that this proposition can be admitted only if it is taken *specificatively*, and even then, only as *impropria*.³⁸

(3) In deduction IA. (p. 128) Bäck treats the term 'Christ' as a predicate. It is clear, however, that the term 'Christ' in this context has only the function of referring to the suppositum of the Son. So it would be more fitting if it were treated as a proper name.

(4) The conclusion of deduction IA. is not a formally contradictory formula. For, if $\lceil \lceil x.Jx \rceil$ is false, then $\lceil (x) (Jx \supset Dx) \& \neg Dx \rceil$ is, even if "vacuously", true.

(5) In deduction IA. Bäck treats the term 'God' as a proper name. Aquinas, however, explicitly states that "hoc nomen Deus est nomen appellativum et non proprium, quia significant naturam divinam ut in habente."³⁹

(6) Formula 6. in deduction IB. on Bäck's interpretation reads: "Whatever is the Creator is identical with Christ", that is, "Whatever is not identical with Christ is not the Creator". So, on this formalization, the Father, being different from the Son,

³⁶ St. Thomas, 3SN,d.5,q.3,a.3. in exposition, cf.fn.7.

³⁷ Bäck, p. 145. The locus is Duns Scotus, *Quaestiones Quodlibetales*, ed. cit., vol. XII, q.3.

³⁸ "Haec propositio, accipiendo ly secundum quod proprie, ut est nota inhaerentiae reduplicacionis praedicati, falsa est. Secundum autem quod specificat, sive distrahit ipsum praedicatum, ut notet creationem secundum quid; sic potest concedi: quamvis tamen sit impropria" (Duns Scotus, 3SN,d.11,q.2. in corpore).

³⁹ St. Thomas, ST 1,q.13,a.9 ad 2um.

would not be the Creator. But "Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus sunt unus creator".⁴⁰

(7) Deduction IB. is formally invalid. For 5. $\lceil (x) (Cx \supset \neg Dx) \rceil$ and 6. $\lceil (x) (Cx \supset x=j) \rceil$ does not entail 7. $\lceil \neg Dj \rceil$. Because, if 5. and 6. are vacuously true, then the negation of 7. can also be true.

All in all, the correct formalization of Bäck's argument, in my opinion, would be the following:

- IC. 1. $(x) (Gx \supset Cx)$ (Whatever is God is the Creator)
 2. Gj (Christ is God)
 3. Mj (Christ is a man)
 4. $(x) (Mx \supset D^1x)$ (Whatever is a man is created, i.e. has a created nature)
 5. $(x) (Cx \supset \neg D^2x)$ (Whatever is the Creator is not created, i.e. has an uncreated nature)
 6. Cj (1,2) (Christ is the Creator)
 7. $\neg D^2j$ (5,6) (Christ is not created, i.e. has an uncreated nature)
 8. D^1j (3,4) (Christ is created, i.e. has a created nature)
 9. $D^1j \& \neg D^2j$ (7,8) (Christ is created and not created, i.e. has a created and an uncreated nature)

This deduction is formally valid, and if 'D¹' and 'D²' were the same predicate, its conclusion would be formally contradictory. But, as I have argued, 'x is created' in premise 4. must be used in a sense according to which it is equivalent to 'x has a created nature', while in premise 5. 'x is not created' must be used in a sense according to which it is equivalent to 'x has an uncreated nature'. It is this determination of sense that is represented by the difference of 'D¹' and 'D²'. Now, from this formalization we can easily get the result we have already arrived at: if the argument is valid, that is, if 'D¹' and 'D²' are treated as distinct predicates throughout the whole argument, then its conclusion is not contradictory; if, on the other hand, we take the conclusion to be contradictory, that is, if we take 'D¹' and 'D²' to be the same predicate in the conclusion, then the argument is not valid.

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